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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO			
2	WESTERN DIVISION			
3	BRENDON TAYLOR, et a	=1., :	CASE NO. 1:24-cv-0204	
4		intiffs, :	ODAL ADGIDITIVE	
5	VS.	:	ORAL ARGUMENT	
6	al.,		26th of August, 2024 10:44 a.m.	
7	Defe	endants.		
8	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUSAN J. DLOTT, JUDGE			
9	BEFORE THE	HONORABLE SUSAI	N J. DLOTT, JUDGE	
10	APPEARANCES:			
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Proceedings recorded in stenotype.

Transcript produced with computer-aided transcription.

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (Proceedings held in open court at 10:44 a.m.) 3 THE DEPUTY: All rise. This court is now in session pursuant to the recess, The Honorable Judge Susan J. 4 5 Dlott presiding. Please be seated. United States -- or Brendon Taylor versus Jesse Lee Anthony Hooven, et al, Case 6 No. 24-cv-204. 7 8 THE COURT: Good morning to everyone. Let me ask 9 counsel to enter their appearances, and we'll start with Mr. 10 Whittaker. 11 MR. WHITTAKER: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Justin Whittaker for the plaintiffs, Holly Hooven and 12 13 Brendon Taylor. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 City of Cincinnati, who's sitting at which table? 16 MR. PAUL: Good morning, Your Honor. Shuva Paul 17 for the City of Cincinnati here. 18 THE COURT: I'm sorry, what is your name? 19 MR. PAUL: Shuva Paul. "Paul" is the last name. 20 THE COURT: Oh, it's your last name? 21 MR. PAUL: Yeah, yeah. 22 THE COURT: Okay. What's your first name? 23 MR. PAUL: Shuva. 24 THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. I have got it 25 backwards here on this.

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                THE DEPUTY: I have it backwards.
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                MR. PAUL: Wouldn't be the first time. If I had a
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      nickel for every time.
                THE COURT: How long have you been with the City?
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                MR. PAUL: Since 2012.
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                THE COURT: Surprised I've never seen you before.
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           Ms. Baron?
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                MS. BARON: Yes, Your Honor, for the City.
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                THE COURT: Good morning.
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               MS. BARON: Good morning.
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               MR. FRIEDMANN: Michael Friedmann for Hamilton
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      County.
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                MS. FISCHER: Kathleen Fischer for Hamilton County.
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                THE COURT: Okay. We have the second generation of
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      Friedmanns here too. I know I've been on the bench too long
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      when I'm getting people's kids.
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            All right. We're here today in Brendon Taylor versus
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       Jesse Lee Anthony Hooven, and, first, I want to take care of
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       some preliminary things. Plaintiffs have moved the clerk
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      for -- clerk of court for an entry of default. Officer
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      Hooven's attorney, let's see, his attorney entered -- his
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      attorney entered an appearance and he's moved for dismissal
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      of insufficient service of process.
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                MR. WHITTAKER: Yes, Your Honor. They moved for
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      dismissal after the clerk calculated their answer time for
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1 August 22nd, and then the motion itself, however, doesn't 2 actually address the service date. So we have a couple of 3 weeks to respond, but we're going to respond this week. I 4 would expect that they would withdraw the motion once 5 they've maybe looked at the docket, but we're going to 6 respond this week to that motion. 7 THE COURT: Who filed that, Mr. Gottesman? 8 MR. WHITTAKER: Mr. Gottesman. 9 THE COURT: All right. We're not going to play 10 Mickey Mouse here. Let's see. Officer Hooven works for the 11 City. I want you to order him to your office to be served. 12 How are you going to do this? 13 MR. WHITTAKER: Judge, I think the clerk has 14 already found that he has been served, but --15 THE COURT: But there's a difference of opinion 16 about it. We're not doing these Mickey Mouse things. He's 17 going to get his ass served. Pardon me. This angers me. 18 MR. WHITTAKER: I think because his counsel have 19 appeared, I can do Rule 5 by filing a notice in the record 20 of service of the complaint. I think that's the only way I 21 can. 22 THE COURT: No. He is an employee of the City. He 23 can make himself available to be served. I guess you do 24 personal service. 25 MR. WHITTAKER: I'm happy to serve him however is

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       the most convenient for the City.
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                THE COURT: All right.
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                MR. PAUL: If I may, I understand that they're not
       accepting service on his behalf.
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                THE COURT: No, they don't have to accept service.
       I want them to order him to be at the solicitor's office and
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7
       he can get served there.
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                MR. PAUL: With the understanding that the City has
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       made it clear that they are not representing Officer Hooven.
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                THE COURT: No, no, I understand that, but you are
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       his boss.
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                MR. PAUL: Okay.
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                THE COURT: You can order him. So you and Mr.
14
       Whittaker work out arrangements for when this can be done in
15
       the next week.
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                MR. WHITTAKER: I'm available at the City's
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       convenience to do that, Your Honor.
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                MR. PAUL: We'll consult.
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                THE COURT: This is outrageous that a police
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       officer is avoiding service. I'm really offended.
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                MR. PAUL: I don't disagree, Your Honor. I will
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       say, Your Honor, when police officers act in the scope of
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       their duties and they're acting, then, certainly, we do
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       everything we can to facilitate that. And, in fact, we, you
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       know, take seriously the idea of not serving an officer at
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1 any other place, like their residence, but we don't accept 2 service on behalf of people who have personal matters, so 3 that's why this has probably come out like this. It's not 4 on --5 THE COURT: It's not your fault. It is the officer's fault. And I want to cure that without a whole 6 7 bunch of pleadings back and forth; that is not necessary, 8 that offends me. He works for the City. You order him to 9 be at the solicitor's office so Mr. Whittaker can serve him 10 at a time that works out with you all in the next week. 11 MR. PAUL: Okay. City appreciates the 12 clarification, Your Honor. 13 MR. WHITTAKER: Just to clarify for the record, the 14 plaintiffs aren't suggesting that the City has done 15 anything, or should be doing anything differently, to assist 16 with that. 17 THE COURT: I understand this completely. He's 18 dodging service. 19 MR. WHITTAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: He's making it difficult. He and Mr. 21 Gottesman are apparently making it difficult to get him 22 served. You know, we're not -- pardon me, but we're not in 23 state court, we are in federal court, and I don't put up 24 with this kind of stuff. Okay, we solved that problem. 25 MR. WHITTAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Oh, Mr. Whittaker, have you 2 requested and obtained the memorandum of understanding 3 that's been mentioned in discovery? MR. WHITTAKER: I have not asked for it, but I've 4 gotten a copy of it independently of having to ask for it. 5 THE COURT: So you have it? 6 7 MR. WHITTAKER: As far as I know, I have it, but I 8 assume once we get into discovery, that will be produced. 9 THE COURT: Well, that's sort of a critical thing 10 with this motion. So, you know, I need to know that you are 11 aware of what it says, because I think that because of 12 what's been pleaded -- is it in the counterclaim, Peggy, 13 cross-claim, counterclaim? 14 MS. FECHTEL: The memorandum of understanding was 15 brought up by Ms. Paul in her cross-claim. 16 THE COURT: Yeah, yeah. And because of that, 17 because of the suggestion in her cross-claim, I think you 18 may want to -- you may want leave to amend the complaint. 19 MR. WHITTAKER: That's what I was going to ask for 20 today, Your Honor. I think that might cure everybody's 21 concerns. If I had had knowledge of the memorandum of 22 understanding before filing the response, I absolutely would 23 have asked to amend, but perhaps that was an error, 24 strategic error, on my part, but I just wanted to get in 25 front of the Court however I could. If an amendment will

cure that --

THE COURT: Yeah, I will give you leave to amend, and I would like the City to immediately send a copy of this memo over to Mr. Whittaker so that he has an official version.

MR. PAUL: May I address the relevance of the MOU, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PAUL: You know, so in this instance, even if he were to have the MOU, it's not relevant because of the sole purpose of Jesse Hooven's actions were to gain -- this is drawing on the complaint -- to gain dirt on his ex-wife's fiance for leverage in their private child custody dispute. So the City asks really: What is more personal than a divorce and an accompanying child custody dispute? The MOU would be, if it was between City and county for government-related purposes. And the plaintiffs, it's the plaintiffs themselves, who allege that Officer Hooven made it clear and that Madison Paul understood it, this has nothing to do with any City investigation, no law enforcement investigation.

And so this is not like, for example, the *Stengel* case, which the City cited in the brief. That's the 50-year-old case where the officer, an off-duty officer, intervened in a physical altercation in a bar. And the Court ruled, well,

you know, had he not intervened, he would have been subjected to discipline because he stepped up pursuant to a department regulation and then he overstepped his bounds by, you know, exceeding that.

But here, there is no, there is no -- he would not -- would Officer Hooven have been disciplined had he not asked or allegedly asked for this information? No, because there was no City investigation concerning Mr. Taylor or Ms. Hooven. So it's a red herring, Your Honor.

The MOU, we'll certainly provide it because that's something that Mr. Whittaker could have requested at any time, but it doesn't change the fact that his claims don't make it past a prima facia stage. And I can expound on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Paul, if it makes you feel any better, I have the exact same reaction to that as you did.

But my law clerk pointed out to me a Sixth Circuit case from 2019, Morris versus City of Detroit, which states, to determine whether a person acted under the color of state law, the Sixth Circuit has explained that, quote: "The fact that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform, is not controlling. It is the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty or off duty which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law."

MR. PAUL: And actually, Your Honor, we rely heavily on that case for the proposition that the claims — and we're talking about Counts 2 and 4, the municipal liability claims against the City — can't proceed, and here's why. In that case — this is Morris v City of Detroit. The officer in that case was on duty, wore her badge, had department—issued handcuffs, went to the plaintiff's home to collect a personal debt of \$300, got into the physical altercation, drew her department—issued firearm, fired a shot at the plaintiff missing the plaintiff. And the Court agreed that the officer did not manifest the requisite showing of state—granted authority to act under color of law.

So instead of a personal debt of \$300, what we have here with Officer Hooven is a personal vendetta against his ex-wife's fiance. He didn't like the fact, according to the allegations, that they were going to get married. It's the same thing, the sole purpose was to get dirt so he could use it in his child custody case. And plaintiffs have not disputed the legal analysis in *Morris*, Your Honor. That case is fatal to their claims against the City at this stage.

THE COURT: Okay. I think you've gotten into your argument.

MR. PAUL: I'm sorry.

1 THE COURT: No, that's fine, that's fine. Felix, is that you in the back? No. 2 3 MR. HICKS: William Hicks from the City. THE COURT: I thought you looked familiar. 4 5 MR. HICKS: Just coming to supervise. 6 THE COURT: It was my pleasure to have you in my courtroom awhile ago, you and Emily. 7 8 Okay. Well --9 MR. WHITTAKER: Judge, if I might respond to that 10 argument, if you're inclined to hear it. THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 11 12 MR. WHITTAKER: We rely on the Morris case too. 13 It's a summary judgment case, and all of the authorities 14 that the City relies on and argues from are based on summary 15 judgment, not 12(b)(6). It's inappropriate at this stage to 16 go through the complaint with a fine-tooth comb and say this 17 fails, this fails, this fails. The City is arguing that 18 these things didn't happen or these things don't matter or 19 certain aspects, just because they are alleged, that must be 20 the entire basis for the claim, and it's not. The overall 21 umbrella argument in the complaint is Officer Hooven 22 accessed this system that he could not have come anywhere 23 close to but for his status as a police officer. And the 2.4 MOU roundly acknowledges that and supports that conclusion. 25 I don't think we needed the MOU in the complaint to

survive a motion to dismiss. The MOU solidifies that point that there was a policy that is apparently undisputed that allowed information-sharing between JFS workers and police officers. Officer Hooven took advantage of that policy that only he could access because he's a police officer, got to Ms. Paul because she's a JFS worker, evidently. Ms. Paul alleged that she was acting within the scope of her duty, of her obligations, and color of State law, and she presumably would not have shared that information with Officer Hooven but for him acting under the color of State law as a police officer himself.

So the cases in the Sixth Circuit say, you know, even if a police officer or public official departs from his duties, or whatever his intent, if he's abusing the authority bestowed upon him by the state, or by the City in this case -- which is exactly what we allege in the case and which exactly appears to have happened because of the MOU -- then, that's acting under a color of State law or at least a strong indicia of that fact, more than sufficient enough to survive a motion to dismiss. It's possible in discovery that the claims against -- the MOU claims won't survive, but that is way -- very premature now under 12(b)(6).

THE COURT: Well, it's up to you if you want to amend your complaint.

MR. WHITTAKER: I do, Your Honor, I do.

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                THE COURT: All right. Then, I think -- you know,
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       I'm not going to decide this today. I'm here to hear the
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       arguments for it, and I think I've heard guite a bit
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       alreadv.
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                MR. PAUL: Your Honor, I don't mean to -- I don't
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       know if you were going to go forward, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Yeah, I was. I intended to start that
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       way.
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                MR. PAUL: I'll be happy to follow the Court's
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       discretion and reserve comment.
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                THE COURT: Why don't we start over, then. I've
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       gotten the flavor of your arguments already, but since it's
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       the City's motion to dismiss, are you going to argue it, Mr.
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       Paul?
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                MR. PAUL: Yes, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Approach the podium.
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                MR. PAUL: Good morning and may it please the
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              Your Honor, we have certainly gotten into the
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       reasons why Plaintiffs' claims against the City should be
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       dismissed at the pleading stage. And I'm going to -- really
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       this case calls for a very straightforward application of
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       this very basic principle that is really not up for dispute.
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       It's the principle that any 1983 municipal liability claim
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       in order to proceed -- well, actually, it warrants dismissal
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       and cannot proceed when the alleged conduct is purely
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private. And that's what we have here, despite Plaintiffs' speculation as to, you know, what things could be if the facts were completely different.

Your Honor started -- at the outset of this proceeding, Your Honor suggested that plaintiffs may want the MOU because they may want to take a look at it, you know. And I want to come back to that in a second because underlying the plaintiffs' failure is *Twombly*. You know, they're combining conclusory allegations about a policy and custom of an action -- or even the color of law argument itself, but combining it with very detailed factual allegations that are fatal to their claims.

And this is -- and when Mr. Whittaker talks about

Morris being a summary judgment case, really, that's

plaintiffs' only objection to that, to the applicability of

that case. Plaintiffs are the master of their complaint.

They are the ones who inserted such detailed allegations

into their complaints and pleadings that -- what more should

the Court look at? Well, if you look at our motion to

dismiss, we drew all of our facts from the complaints. We

didn't go outside of that.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question.

MR. PAUL: Yes.

THE COURT: If he amends his complaint, then, where

25 are you?

MR. PAUL: So we're still back -- this is the question, you know, can they amend the complaint to turn the purpose of Officer Hooven into something -- into other than it was? Because they're the ones who said that his sole purpose was to get dirt on his ex-wife's fiance, right? So, remember, in -- you know, if there had been a department policy where he needed to act according to it and then overstepped the bounds, well, then, you might -- then, there might be implicating 1983. Of course, once you get there, you still have to show that the City was a moving force behind it, right?

So I'm really focussing on color of law here, Your Honor, because that's the most straightforward path of dismissal. We're not conceding constitutional violation, not conceding that there's a moving force. The plaintiffs have alleged only in a very conclusory way that there's some — that the act of Officer Hooven could be even fairly attributed to the City.

Deliberate indifference, you know, it's the opposite of deliberate indifference when the City looks at whether Officer Hooven used the City's law enforcement database. And so they looked back a year and said, all right, no, there's been no use of this, that was so -- so the plaintiffs allege that, they say that, yeah. I mean, the complaint is so detailed as to Officer Hooven making it

clear that he's not doing anything related to a City investigation and that Madison Paul -- the person he was dating during the time of this complaint of conduct -- knew that. She in her -- you know, and they've alleged that she did it as a personal favor.

So when plaintiffs say that but for the authority of his office, you know, it would not have been -- the conduct would not have occurred or the defendant would not have gone into the system, well, that's not true because they're the ones alleging that you have a personal relationship between the two defendants for whatever amount of time there was. He made it clear I can't -- there's no City investigation here. She is not relying on that because she's saying, yeah, I knew that. Those are the plaintiffs' allegations.

So take the MOU and look at it and where does it get you, Your Honor? It still gets you where the officer is going completely rogue on a personal vendetta. Do we have an instance -- I think in order -- what, perhaps, the plaintiffs are asking the Court to speculate on is that maybe the City -- they haven't alleged this, they haven't alleged a pattern of this happening and that the City is looking the other way.

The MOU is not -- I don't think Mr. Whittaker will stand here and say that the MOU is going to say that the County should divulge personal information to city officers

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to help them with their personal matters; that's not common sense to look at it that way. It's the plaintiffs are the master of their complaint. They may have other claims, but they don't belong in federal court under Section 1983, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I understand your argument. Peggy -- I'm sorry. I want to introduce to you my law clerk, Peggy Fechtel, who has been with me way over 20 years. MS. FECHTEL: Thank you, Judge. Judge mentioned the Morris case. There was another more recent Supreme Court case, Lindke, L-I-N-D-K-E, 601 US 187. And I don't recall if the parties addressed that significantly, but it seems to me that it maybe tweaks Morris a little bit or it refocuses it when it talks about whether the conduct that caused disparity is traceable to the state's power or authority. And so if the Judge does allow plaintiffs to file the amended complaint and we go through this process again, I would just ask that the parties focus some of their discussion on that newer case. MR. PAUL: Thank you. MR. WHITTAKER: Thank you. MR. PAUL: May I respond to that, Your Honor? THE COURT: Sure, of course.

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MR. PAUL: Well, the starting point, you know, it's hard to imagine how plaintiffs' claims against the City could proceed without a complete overhaul, complete retraction of everything they've alleged to date. You know, I mean, did it start out as an investigation into Mr. Taylor on behalf of the City or Ms. Hooven? No, there was no ongoing investigation. There was nothing pursuant to any -you know, he wasn't trying to exercise his authority of office at all there. You know, in order to abuse your authority, you have to at least use it, and, here, from the outset, he said this is not part of any City investigation. And that's why it's like if the police officer went into a bank wearing the uniform and robbed the bank, is that putting them under a color of law; and, no, that's completely outside of any City interests. It's not pursuant to any City policy or any regulation. That's roque. this is what this officer did. THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. It's funny, under color of state law is a difficult concept, and I don't know if Mr. Hicks remembers -- I don't even know if you were in the office back then -- but I had a case where two on-duty city policeman -- you remember this? MR. PAUL: Tough case, yeah. THE COURT: The Madonna Bar, picked up a woman who was drunk, took her home and raped her, and the jury found

that City wasn't liable.

MR. PAUL: Yeah, and the City addresses that case in our reply. In fact, that case also stands for the proposition that this case should be dismissed.

THE COURT: I think Peggy told me that I was sort of overruled.

MR. PAUL: But that case -- if I remember right, there was testimony in that case that the City had a practice of having its officers take drunken bar patrons home, right? And so at least at this juncture, early juncture, the City was eventually dismissed. I believe during trial Your Honor dismissed us, you know. But in that case, once discovery unfolded and there was no City ratification or deliberate indifference to custom of this happening, so the City was out eventually.

But the standard -- the reason this case that we have here is, you know, there's no policy or custom alleged where the county is supposed to help city officers with their personal matters, and that's why we say the MOU is a red herring. And plaintiffs can amend the complaint, but they're stuck, I believe they're stuck with the sole purpose being what it was.

THE COURT: Thank you. Like I said, if it makes you feel any better, that was my first reaction. I'm not sure I'm right on the law.

Mr. Whittaker.

MR. WHITTAKER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court. The Court said -- observed in the Linthicum case that all that is required under Section 83 is that the official exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only by the wrongdoer clothed with the authorities.

THE COURT: That was it, Linthicum.

allege in the complaint. We just discussed that earlier in the complaint. I can tell the Court, you know, which paragraph by paragraph we make these allegations.

Paragraph 52 of the complaint says: But for his position as a police officer and the trust placed in him by the City of Cincinnati, Officer Hooven never could have coordinated with Ms. Paul to access the system and disseminate the information he learned to Ms. Hooven, his ex-wife.

MR. WHITTAKER: Yes. And that is exactly what we

And the City is telling the Court that there was no investigation, there was no inquiry into this. I don't know how the City can make that argument when Internal Investigation Services did investigate this very action, Citizens' Complaint Authority investigated this action, found culpability there. That's a City agency, you know, saying that Officer Hooven, you know, acting in his -- all but saying acting in his capacity as a police officer

breached the public trust. You know, the chief of police herself signed off on the exoneration of Officer Hooven. I don't know how the City can say that there was no -- I mean, I understand that the City is not getting into policy in its motion, but policy under -- acting under color of state law is intertwined here. If the chief of police herself is signing off on exoneration and writing a handwritten note in the top of the corner recommending further instruction or further discipline to Officer Hooven, I don't know how we can go any higher in authority to say that there is some sort of policy that the City is acting under or that the City was interested in or felt could have been violated, but maybe the investigation didn't get them there to reach the factual conclusion of some sort of liability. But these are all questions of fact.

You know, Mr. Paul is arguing a summary judgment standard. You know, I investigated, you know, 12(b)(6) cases talking about under color of state law, and that questions arises when private actors -- when individuals are private actors trying to claim that their actions are fairly attributable to the state or, on the face of the complaint, there's no allegation of under color of state law at all. So that that's what 12(b)(6) would review.

You know, the fact -- you know, we don't have to prove

the case in the complaint. We just have to put the City and the parties on notice of what the allegations are, the facts underlying the complaint. We can't possibly have all of the facts in front of us while filing the complaint. The complaint is detailed and the complaint specifies that all of these actions from Officer Hooven arose because of his access to this system that he never could have gained access to but for his office as a police officer. Ms. Paul alleges, similarly, at all times she was helping a police officer. I think it's fair to assume, although I can't speak for Ms. Paul, that she would not be helping a private individual get access to information unless she thought she was relying on that person being a police officer and relying on a policy allowing her to give that information to a police officer.

So we intend to take Your Honor up on the opportunity to exercise our leave to amend the complaint to add allegations related to the MOU. It's not going to be a radical overhaul. We haven't learned -- you know, we haven't had any discovery yet, so we don't have any additional facts to allege except for what Ms. Paul has added in her counterclaim or cross-claim. So, you know, it's sort of bolstering the complaint rather than the complaint being dependent on the MOU.

We will, obviously, take Your Honor up on that, but we

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       feel that the standard is clearly met under cases in the
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       Sixth Circuit and in the Supreme Court which make it clear
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       that under acting under color of state law at this point in
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       the pleading stage is properly pleaded in this situation.
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       And if Your Honor has any questions, I'm happy to take them.
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                THE COURT: I was going to say, life was much
       easier before Twombly.
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                MR. WHITTAKER: People are still figuring out what
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       Twombly actually means.
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                THE COURT: No. Peggy, anything you want to ask?
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                MS. FECHTEL: No. I think just procedure, assuming
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       he files a new motion, I expect there to be another
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       motion -- excuse me, assuming plaintiffs file a new
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       complaint, I assume there will be another motion to dismiss.
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                THE COURT: Right.
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                MS. FECHTEL: I don't know if there's any way to
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       tighten that up this round.
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                THE COURT: Yeah, I don't think there is,
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       unfortunately.
20
            Okay. Thank you, Mr. Whittaker, I understand what
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       you're saying.
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                MR. WHITTAKER:
                                Thank you, Judge.
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                THE COURT: Mr. Paul?
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                MR. PAUL: Thank you.
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                THE COURT: Oh, let me ask you this, Mr. Whittaker,
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       when will you file your amended complaint by?
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                MR. WHITTAKER: Yes, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: You don't have to get back up. I just
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       need you to tell me how long you need.
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                MR. WHITTAKER: I'm going to be out of town
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       starting this Thursday. I will file it before then.
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                THE COURT: Oh, okay. That's fine.
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                MR. WHITTAKER: I want to get in front of Your
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       Honor as soon as possible. I don't want to delay.
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                THE COURT: Great. Thank you.
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                MR. PAUL: Twombly matters, and if you turn to
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       paragraph 52, right.
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                THE COURT: Judge Barrett and I sort of refused to
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       agree with Twombly, but --
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                MR. PAUL: When I first started, it had just been
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       on the books and there was some speculation, Your Honor, as
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       to whether Twombly would -- you know, what kind of
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       difference Twombly would make, but words matter. If you
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       look at paragraph 52 of plaintiffs' complaint where
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       plaintiffs allege, but for his position as a police officer
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       and the trust placed in him by the City of Cincinnati,
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       Officer Hooven could never have coordinated SACWIS facts.
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       Well, that is the -- if not the ultimate issue, because
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       there's a lot more to prove to get to admissible liability
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       besides color of law, besides constitution violation,
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there's a lot more to prove, which plaintiffs haven't even alleged enough, but it's a threshold issue. But for his authority, would he have done that? So that's a conclusory allegation that the Court should not take as true.

And when we look at the complaint and we look at the allegations that are factual, they spell out in no uncertain terms that she did it as a personal favor to him. She said so. They say she said so. So 52 is not -- should not be credited as a factual allegation, paragraph 52, Your Honor.

Mr. Whittaker spoke about the exoneration of Officer
Hooven. The charge that he was exonerated on was improper
access to a law enforcement database. So when the City
looked at that and they researched the Regional Crime
Information Center database going back a year and they
interviewed everybody who was involved in this dispute, this
personal dispute, yeah, they verified exactly what the
plaintiffs have alleged and admitted, conceded, in their
pleadings, that no City law enforcement database was
accessed.

And so if anything, that goes to how much of an uphill climb or impossible climb the plaintiffs would have even if they could show color of law because they don't have facts in there showing that the City was deliberately indifferent to a pattern or custom violation of this. They're not looking the other way when officers are accessing personal

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information. So there's no -- there's so -- we would say that it's futile to amend the complaint, Your Honor. I don't see how that would be an efficient use of judicial resources and it would keep the City in a case long past its due point.
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As to Ms. Paul's allegations, you know, this all just goes to show how much of a personal dispute this is between the parties involved. She may have -- she may be trying to -- she's arguing for indemnification for the count. She may be seeking to create a defense for herself as to why she allegedly disclosed access, you know, disclosed confidential information from the county database. As far as our motion goes, you know, no one is disputing it's her access to a county database that they're looking -- that the plaintiffs are concerned about, there's nothing here that suggests that the plaintiffs -- that Officer Hooven relied on his authority as a Cincinnati police officer to gain access through the City's law enforcement database, or to represent to anybody that there was a City investigation that warranted disclosure of such information that he himself said he wanted as leverage on his ex-wife's fiancee.

THE COURT: Thank you, thank you.

Peggy, any questions?

MR. PAUL: Oh, if I may address *Lindke*. I totally forgot to address *Lindke*. I'm sorry. If I may?

1 THE COURT: Sure. 2 MR. PAUL: I believe, I believe you're talking 3 about the case where the City manager in Port Huron had a 4 personal Facebook page. And if that's the case we're 5 talking about, then, that case again doesn't help the 6 plaintiffs here. That case held that -- holding there was 7 that a public official who prevents somebody from commenting 8 on an official social media page engages in state action 9 only if the official possessed actual authority to speak on 10 the state's behalf or purported to have authority speaking 11 on social media posts. 12 Here, the officer is saying I'm not doing anything 13 related to City business. You know, and anyone he's -- the 14 plaintiffs allege in their own complaint that he would speak 15 and vent about his animosity towards his ex-wife and his 16 child custody dispute; that is not government business. 17 MR. WHITTAKER: Judge, if I may. He tells his 18 ex-wife --19 THE COURT: Wait, wait. Let Mr. Paul finish. 20 MR. WHITTAKER: I apologize. 21 MR. PAUL: Sorry. I don't know how that case helps 22 plaintiffs in any way and I appreciate the --23 MS. FECHTEL: I'm just asking you for standard of 24 I understand the facts. 25 MR. PAUL: Sure.

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MS. FECHTEL: But they have a standard of law that seems -- to me at least, arguably changes the focus a little bit and puts it much more where the authority to act comes from possibly more than intent. And, again, my point in raising it is only in that I don't believe either side did address it, and so I just urge you to help the Judge know how to read it. But, I mean, I don't know that it's so much the facts. Yeah, the facts are weird, and I believe that that's a Sixth Circuit case, but they do kind of go into what color of state law means and how you look at it, and I don't know if they were intending to do it, but it certainly jumped out at me in reading it. MR. PAUL: The City appreciates the level of detail in the complaint giving personal details on a relationship. That kind of, you know, explains why she did it as a favor I mean, he didn't come to her as saying this is part of an investigation. So I think that this takes it completely out of the ambit of how do you attribute this to the City when at the outset the both of them are acknowledging to each other, yeah, this is not a government purpose here. Yeah, sorry. THE COURT: Anything else, Peggy? MS. FECHTEL: No, ma'am. THE COURT: Mr. Paul? Mr. Whittaker? MR. WHITTAKER: Just very briefly, Your Honor.

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would just like to call the Court's attention to Paragraphs 85 through 90 of the complaint when the plaintiffs allege exactly that the City was deliberately indifferent to the rights of Mr. Taylor and Ms. Hooven by failing to supervise Officer Hooven and properly investigate him, as evidenced by the top police official, the chief herself, exercising decision-making authority as to whether or not to sustain or exonerate Officer Hooven for his conduct. This despite the fact that he's on the Brady list already, and despite the fact that he's already been found --THE COURT: He's on the what list? MR. WHITTAKER: He's on the Brady list, Your Honor, for actions involving dishonesty with a DUI a few years ago. MR. PAUL: Excuse me. THE COURT: Yeah, it's all right. MR. WHITTAKER: And the department sustained an act of finding of illegality in connection with that. So the allegations from Paragraphs 85 through 90 discuss that, discuss the City's deliberate indifference and the City's failure to supervise and investigate. Again, the City is still arguing evidence, facts, things that will be excellent discussions on summary judgment, but we're not there yet. So thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Whittaker. Yeah, Mr. Paul, go ahead.

1 MR. PAUL: Sorry, Your Honor. Just on the PageID 2 70 of Document 1, that's the exhibit to plaintiffs' 3 complaint. 4 THE COURT: Where are you now? MR. PAUL: Document 1, plaintiffs' complaint, 5 6 PageID 70, there's a chart there and that's the Brady list 7 where prosecutors are made aware of certain, you know, 8 occurrences. But I'm not sure where Mr. Whittaker got 9 dishonesty from. He was -- he had a minor misdemeanor, an 10 OVI conviction, so that is -- now what plaintiffs need to 11 do, if they want to show a pattern, is not that this 12 particular officer had some unrelated conduct in the past, 13 unrelated to this issue before the Court, they've got to 14 show a pattern -- you know, do we need to show a different 15 kind of pattern of conduct on behalf on the part of the 16 City, whether it's ratification, policy and custom, or 17 deliberate indifference. They only call it a pattern and 18 custom of inaction, and they're only looking at how the City 19 handled the complaint about Officer Hooven. That in and of 20 itself does not get it to a municipal liability claim, even 21 if you could prove state color of law. Thank you, Your 22 Honor. 23 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Paul. 24 Where's the County fit into this, Mr. Friedmann? 25 MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, we don't take a

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      position on either one of them. We're here just to observe
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       today.
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                THE COURT: Okay, okay. All right.
            Then, anything else for the good of the order here?
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                MR. PAUL: No, Your Honor, nothing.
                MR. WHITTAKER: Nothing more from plaintiffs, Your
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      Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. We
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      will -- I will take a look again at these cases. And you're
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      going to file your amended complaint by this week, end of
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       this week, so I quess you'll have to file a new motion
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       anyway.
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                MR. WHITTAKER: To clarify, Your Honor, leave is
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      granted or I need to apply for leave?
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                THE COURT: No, no, leave is granted.
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                MR. WHITTAKER:
                                Thank you, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: I like to cut through the formalities.
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               MR. WHITTAKER: Very good.
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                THE COURT: This reminds me -- I hate to reminisce
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      with you guys, but this reminds me -- were you here, Peggy?
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       It was the professor at UC, he was a criminal law professor.
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                MS. FECHTEL: It was not my case.
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                THE COURT: Yeah. I had a case, he was a criminal
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       law professor at UC. His wife was a lawyer. She was over
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       at in Kentucky with the school over there. I don't know if
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       you guys remember this one.
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                MS. FISCHER:
                              I do.
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                THE COURT: It was like being in domestic relations
       court for a week. I'll never forget that case as long as I
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             The City had -- she complained that he had abused
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       her, so the City issued a warrant for his arrest, so he sued
       the City. And he had already -- I think the City had -- I
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       remember my old boss, Jim -- can't think of his last name --
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       was the Clerk of Courts at the time, and they were just
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       handing these things out without any discretion or review or
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       anything. So the two of them duked it out in my courtroom
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       for a week.
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            And I thought I'll never forget that because the whole
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       time I thought to myself, I feel like I'm sitting in
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       domestic relations court. They hated each other so much
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       that when they exchanged the kids, the two little children,
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       that he would leave them on the edge of the sidewalk right
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       next to the street and she would come out and get them.
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       That was as close as they got to each other.
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                MR. PAUL: I will say, Your Honor, that, you know,
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       it's been nothing but collegial between counsel and at least
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       we have that.
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                THE COURT: What was his name?
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            (Off-the-record discussion.)
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                THE COURT: Anything further from anyone?
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1	MR. WHITTAKER: Nothing from plaintiffs, Your		
2	Honor.		
3	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all very much.		
4	MR. PAUL: Thank you, Judge.		
5	THE DEPUTY: All rise. Court is now adjourned.		
6	(Proceedings concluded at 11:28 a.m.)		
7	CERTIFICATE		
8	In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753, I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter prepared from my stenotype notes and that the transcript page format is in accordance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.		
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11	Lisa Conley Gungblut 09/16/2024 LISA CONLEY YUNGBLUT, RDR, RMR, CRR, CRC DATE		
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